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Abstract 
Our paper estimates and compares behavioral New-Keynesian DSGE models derived 
under two alternative ways to introduce heterogeneous expectations. We assume that 
agents may be either short-sighted or long-horizon forecasters. The difference does not 
matter when agents have rational expectations, but it does when a fraction of them form 
beliefs about the future according to some heuristics. Bayesian estimations show that a 
behavioral model based on short forecasters fits the data better than one based on long 
forecasters. Long-horizon predictors exhibit very poor predictive ability, whereas the 
short forecasters’ model also outperforms the rational expectation framework. We show 
that the superiority is due to its ability to capture heterogeneous consumers’ 
expectations. Finally, by Monte-Carlo-filtering mapping, we investigate the 
indeterminacy regions to complement existing literature. 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical evidence finds a substantial heterogeneity in the formation of beliefs and 
usually rejects the rationality of inflation forecasts.1 Ample evidence of various kinds 
suggests that heterogeneous expectations are very relevant. Evidence for heterogeneous 
beliefs is also found in laboratory experiments.2  
Two popular approaches to incorporate heterogeneous expectations in the New 
Keynesian model were proposed by Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro (2013). 
Both assume that at least part of the population form expectations by some heuristics, 
but they differ in the assumed time–horizon of forecasts. Focusing on short-horizon 
forecasters, Branch and McGough (2009) derive aggregate dynamics depend on one–
period–ahead subjective heterogeneous forecasts.3 Massaro (2013) assumes, instead, 
that agents choose optimal plans while considering forecasts of macroeconomic variables 
over an infinite horizon, as a result, the predicted aggregate dynamics hinge on long-
horizon forecasts.4  
The popularization of models based on short-horizon forecasts and long-horizon 
expectations raises important and relevant research questions: (a) do short- and long-
horizon forecasts fit the data well? (b) Is the empirical fit of short- and long-horizon 
forecasts better than the one of rational expectation hypothesis (REH)?  
Our paper’s approach to these questions is based on Bayesian estimations. We 
investigate the performance in fitting data of the two alternatives in terms of marginal 
likelihood and estimated moments. We also explore the indeterminacy regions implied 
by the two approaches by Monte-Carlo-Filtering mapping.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.  
1. A behavioral New Keynesian model derived with short forecasters fits the data 
better than one based on long forecasters. Short forecasters also outperform 
rational expectations. Comparisons are based on log–marginal likelihoods and 
moments. The moments implied by the model with short-horizon predictors are 
the closest to the observed data. The model with long-horizon predictors exhibits 
instead a poor predictive ability.  
2. We provide evidence that shows how the superiority of the short forecasters’ 
model over the others considered is due to the behavioral specification of the 
dynamic aggregate demand equation. Short–horizon predictors better fit 
heterogeneity in consumers’ expectations than long-horizon ones. By contrast, 
the heterogeneity in producers’ expectations is less relevant to discriminate 
between the models.  
3. The analysis based on the Monte-Carlo Filtering mapping complements the results 
on monetary policies obtained by Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro 
(2013). Exploring a reasonable range of parameters, the estimates of the 
behavioral New Keynesian model with long–horizon predictors are strongly 
affected by its determinacy conditions. Precisely, it tends to overestimate the 
degree of price stickiness and the central bank’s response to the output gap.  
4. The main policy implications that one may draw from our paper are that DSGE 
models for policy analysis should incorporate heterogeneous expectations. 
                                           
1Mankiw et al. (2004) is the main reference. Early studies are Roberts (1997) and Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989). Similar results are also obtained by Carroll (2003), Branch (2004), Andolfatto et al. (2008), Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2010), Andrade and Le Bihan (2013), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Dovern (2015), Dräger 
et al. (2016). 
2See Hommes et al. (2005), Adam (2007), and Hommes (2011). 
3Agents are boundedly rational and behave similar to Euler equation learners in the sense that optimal 
decisions are based on the perceived Euler equation. See Honkapohja et al. (2013). 
4See also Preston (2006). 
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Moreover, all agents should be modeled according to the Branch and McGough’s 
(2009) approach in such a model setup.  
Our research is related to several branches of the literature. In particular, they concern 
monetary policy analysis in the New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations 
and the empirical fit of REH models vs. models of bounded rationality and the empirical 
fit of DSGE models in general.  
In the REH, the forecasting horizon does not matter. By contrast, it does when agents 
use heuristics to form their expectations. To grasp the intuition, in the realm of DSGE 
models, consumers use short-sighted forecasts when they behave according to the Euler 
equation. In such a case, they have to forecast the next period inflation and 
consumption to decide their current action. Instead, they have to look at long–horizon 
forecasts, if their life cycle–permanent income matters. However, REH imply that short 
and long forecasts are consistent and make no difference for the consumer’s choices. 
The life cycle-permanent income is obtained from the Euler equation and budget 
constraint, iterating forward and applying the law of iterated expectations. Once 
heuristics are considered, the one–by–one equivalence is broken and heuristics for 
short–term expectations and long–term forecasts are no more equivalent.  
Considering some forms of imperfection in the expectations formation process, recent 
theoretical studies show that several puzzles of traditional macro models can be solved. 
For instance, heterogeneous expectations are a parsimonious way to obtain models 
consistent with inflation inertia, output persistence, and “discounted forward guidance.”5 
These studies remain rooted in classical economics and use its powerful tools. By 
parsimonious approaches, agents are modeled as maximizing utility subject to 
constraints, but agents may use heuristics to form expectations. In this framework, 
these agents can be defined individually (instead of fully) rational (Deak et al., 2017). It 
is worth mentioning that other similar approaches have been proposed within the classic 
economics. It has been, e.g., assumed that agents may form expectations by using 
some learning algorithms (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) or that they are subjected to 
infrequent information updating, i.e., inattentiveness.6  
The existing two popular approaches to incorporate heterogeneous expectations in the 
New Keynesian model have different normative and positive implications. The technical 
details and the differences from the REH are discussed in Honkapohja et al. (2013), 
Massaro (2013), Branch and McGough (2016). Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro 
(2013) also study the normative implications of the two approaches for monetary policy, 
when the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule. 
Investigating the determinacy regions associated to their different behavioral New-
Keynesian DSGE monetary models, they find that heterogeneous expectations can 
undermine some standard results. Optimal policies, distributive effects, and welfare 
analysis are also affected by the assumption about the prediction horizon of boundedly 
rational agents (cf. Gasteiger, 2014, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2016; Beqiraj et al., 
2016).  
In the empirical field, Milani (2007) shows that when the conventional assumption of 
rational expectations is relaxed to assume learning by economic agents, “mechanical” 
sources of persistence may be omitted. Learning can induce realistic levels of persistence 
in the models, so the estimated degrees of habit formation and indexation fall from 
values close to one to values close to zero. Model with learning fits the data better than 
the model with rational expectations augmented with indexation and habits. Milani 
(2011) considers the role of psychological factors, market sentiments, and less-than-
                                           
5The latter is related to the so-called forward guidance puzzle. See McKay et al. (2016) and Di Bartolomeo et 
al. (2017). 
6See, among others, Gabaix and Laibson (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2003), Sims, (2003), Moscarini 
(2004). 
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fully-rational shifts in beliefs on economic fluctuations. The empirical results show that 
expectations shocks are a major driving force of the U.S. business cycle; they account 
for roughly half of business cycle fluctuations. Relaxing the rational expectations 
assumption, he allows for learning by economic agents and by expectation shocks he 
captures waves of optimism and pessimism. These waves in turn affect the formation of 
expectations, leading agents to form forecasts that deviate from those implied by their 
learning model.  
Closely related to our work, Deak et al. (2017) estimate a New Keynesian behavioral 
model with heterogeneous agents and bounded-rationality. In their model, a fraction of 
individually rational agents use simple adaptive expectations rules to forecast aggregate 
variables exogenous to their micro-environment. The remaining agents are instead fully 
rational. By Bayesian estimations, they compare their benchmark to some alternatives.7 
Their model fits the data better than in the standard rational expectations New 
Keynesian framework or in a model based on Euler learning. Compared to Deak et al. 
(2017), we consider that agents may be either long or short forecasters. Therefore, we 
extend their work since they do not consider time horizon alternatives for the boundedly 
rational agents, which is instead our primary goal. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to compare estimations of behavioral New Keynesian models embedding 
expectations heterogeneity under the form of long–horizon and short–sighted forecasts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical 
background of our research and introduces different expectations formation processes. 
Section 3 presents the results of our estimates. Section 4 discusses the underlying 
properties of the expectation model that best fit the data. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Theoretical background 
We consider a simple generalization of the small–scale New Keynesian DSGE model to 
account for heterogeneity in expectations. The economy is populated by a continuum of 
households represented by an interval [0,1]. Each household consists of a continuum of 
agents which are employed across firms and share dividends within the household. 
Households maximize the same utility function, but may form their expectations 
according to different processes, expectation operators (ℰ) are thus indexed by 𝑖.  
Agents of kind 𝑖  choose their consumption, {𝐶𝑖}𝑡
∞ , and labor supply, {𝑁𝑖}𝑡
∞ , path to 
maximize the expected present discounted value of their utility, i.e.,  
 ℰ𝑖,0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
(
𝑒𝑥𝑝 ( 𝑧𝑡
𝑑)𝐶𝑖,𝑡
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
− 𝜐
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
1+𝜔
1 + 𝜔
)      (1) 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; 𝜐 denotes the labor disutility scaling parameter; ℰ𝑖,𝑡 
refers to type 𝑖  expectation operator at 𝑡 ; 𝐶𝑡
𝑖 ≡ (∫ 𝐶𝑡
𝑖1
0
(𝑗)
𝜖−1
𝜖 𝑑𝑗)
𝜖
𝜖−1
 is the composite 
consumption good, where 𝐶𝑡
𝑖(𝑗)  is the quantity of good 𝑗  ∈  [0,1]  consumed by the 
household 𝑖 in period 𝑡; 𝑧𝑡
𝑑  is a AR(1) preference shock. The preference shock has the 
following form: 
 𝑧𝑡
𝑑 = 𝜌𝑑𝑧𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑑, (2) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑑  is a white noise stochastic disturbance. Independently to their ability to 
forecast economic variables, we assume that all the agents have unbiased (rational) 
expectations about the evolution of their preferences.8  
                                           
7The benchmark is based on Eusepi and Preston (2011). 
8The assumption does not affect the empirical estimations but it seems the most reasonable. 
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The consistent aggregate price index for consumption is defined by the following 
expression 𝑃𝑡 ≡ [∫ 𝑃𝑡
1
0
(𝑗)1−𝜖𝑑𝑗]
1
1−𝜖
 with 𝜖  denoting the elasticity of substitution among 
goods.  
Similarly, we assume that the supply side of the economy is characterized by a 
continuum of firms of each production type 𝑗, operating under monopolistic competition. 
Firms maximize profits, but may use different processes to form their expectations. As 
long as prices are sticky, heterogeneity in expectations matters. We assume a Calvo 
(1983) price setting framework: firms can reset prices with probability (1 − 𝜉𝑝) ∈ (0,1) 
each time 𝑡. Moreover, labor is the only input needed to produce good 𝑗 according to 
𝑌𝑡 = exp ( 𝑎𝑡)𝑁𝑡 with exp ( 𝑎𝑡) denoting the total factor productivity shock which follows an 
AR(1) structure: 
 𝑎𝑡 = 𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑎 (3) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑎 is a i.i.d. process.  
2.1 Rational agents 
In the above described simple setup, assuming homogeneous rational agents, the 
traditional log-linearized version of the New Keynesian–DSGE model is easily 
represented by the following set of equations (lower-case letters indicate log-
deviations): 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑡Δ𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑 ) (4) 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 (5) 
 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 (6) 
 𝑤𝑡 = 𝜎𝑦𝑡 + 𝜔𝑛𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡
𝑑 (7) 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡 (8) 
where 𝜅 = (1 − 𝜉𝑝)(1 − 𝛽𝜉𝑝)/𝜉𝑝 > 0 and 𝐸𝑡 indicates the mathematical expectation operator 
conditional on the model and the information available at the end of period 𝑡 − 1 (ℰ𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡, ∀ 𝑖). Regarding the variables, 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap; 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation; 𝑟𝑡 indicates the 
nominal expected interest rate; 𝑚𝑐𝑡  is the real marginal cost; 𝑤𝑡  is the real wage; 
Δ𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑 = 𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑 − 𝑧𝑡
𝑑 and 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 is a AR(1) shock to the markup evolving as: 
 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 = 𝜌𝑚𝑧𝑡−1
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 (9) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 is a white noise.  
The economic interpretation of the model (4)–(5) follows. Equation (4) represents the 
dynamic IS (Euler equation); 9  (5) describes the New Keynesian Phillips curve; (6) 
defines the real marginal cost; (7) is the labor supply; (8) is the production function.  
In order to close the model, we specify the behavior of the central bank. We assume that 
the central bank uses the following simple Taylor rule to set interest rates: 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝛿𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛿𝑦𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑟 (10) 
                                           
9Note that we have considered the market clearing condition: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡. 
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It thus responds to both inflation and real activity according to the coefficients 𝛿𝜋 and 𝛿𝑦, 
respectively, and 𝑒𝑡
𝑟 is a (white noise) monetary policy shock.  
2.2 Heterogeneity in expectations 
We now assume that the economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, who may 
differ in the way they form their expectations. In such a case, the predicted aggregate 
dynamics depend on the assumption about horizon forecasts. Specifically, first-order 
conditions and budget constraints can be represented by linking current and one-period 
ahead (expected) variables or, using forward iterations, by relating current and any–
period ahead (expected) variables. As long as expectations are rational, these 
representations are equivalent. But, when the micro-foundations underpinning the New 
Keynesian model are solved relaxing the rational expectations assumption, the 
expectations horizon matters since the representations are no longer equivalent 
(Preston, 2006).  
Along the above insights, to derive parsimonious micro-founded representations of DSGE 
sticky–price models that are consistent with boundedly rational individuals, we consider 
two polar cases. We assume that boundedly rational agents may be either short-sighted 
(SSFs) or long-horizon forecasters (LHFs). SSFs form their expectations focusing on one-
period ahead forecasts based on heuristics. LHFs, instead, use heuristics to forecast 
macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon.10  
In general, assuming SSFs, the dynamic IS (4) and Phillips curve can be represented as  
 𝑦𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
[𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1)] −
𝐸𝑡𝛥𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑
𝜎
 (11) 
 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
(𝛽𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 (12) 
which are simply derived from the aggregation of the consumers’ Euler equations and 
the firms’ pricing rules.  
By contrast, assuming LHFs, first-order conditions are combined with budget constraints 
and iterated forward, yielding11 
 𝑦𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
∑ 𝛽𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
((1 − 𝛽)𝑦𝑠 −
𝛽
𝜎
(𝑟𝑠 − 𝜋𝑠+1)) −
𝐸𝑡𝛥𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑
𝜎
 (13) 
 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
0
∑(𝜉𝑝𝛽)
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
((1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽𝜋𝑠+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑠) + 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 (14) 
It is easy to verify that assuming homogeneous rational agents (i.e., replacing 𝐸𝑡 to ℰ𝑖,𝑡), 
both (11) and (13) collapse to (4); similarly, (12) and (14) converge to (5). In this 
scenario, the forecasting horizon dilemma does not apply.  
Henceforth, we assume that the economy is populated by two types of agents, who 
differ in their expectations formation process. A fraction 𝛼  have rational expectations 
(rational agents), while the remaining 1 − 𝛼  (boundedly rational agents) form 
expectations according to a mechanism of bounded rationality.12  
                                           
10The former approach is formally derived by Branch and McGough (2009), while the latter is obtained by 
Massaro (2013). We refer to these papers for a full and detailed derivation of the equations. 
11A full derivation is provided by Massaro (2013) or Beqiraj et al. (2016). 
12For the sake of brevity, 𝛼 is fixed. See Di Bartolomeo et al. (2016) for a discussion. 
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Each rational agent 𝑖 forecasts macroeconomic variables according to the following rule 
 ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡+1 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 (15) 
where ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ  is the expectation operator used by the rational agent 𝑖 to forecast 𝑥𝑡+1 at 𝑡 
and 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 is an i.i.d. expectation error with zero mean defined in the support identified by 
the agents considered (i.e., in the case of rational agents: (0, 𝛼)). Aggregation among 
rational agents then yields 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℛ
𝛼
0
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 (16) 
The remaining 1 − 𝛼  agents have cognitive limitations and use heuristics to forecast 
macro variables. As previously illustrated, the predicted aggregate dynamics depend on 
the assumption about horizon forecasts.  
2.3 Short-term forecasters 
We begin by assuming SSFs. They set their behavior at time 𝑡  based on their 
expectations on consumption (output) or price at price 𝑡 + 1. Households satisfy an Euler 
equation, while firms set their price according to a Calvo’s pricing rule. However, 
differently from the traditional case, SSFs’ expectations are based on some heuristics 
and affected by systematic errors.  
We assume that all SSFs form their beliefs based on a simple perceived linear law of 
motion, i.e., 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜃𝑥𝑡−1. Therefore, 
 ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜃𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡 (17) 
where ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ  is the expectation operator used by SSFs and 𝜃 is the adaptation operator, 
which implies that SSFs form adaptive (𝜃 < 1) or extrapolative (𝜃 > 1) expectations (we 
refer to 𝜃 = 1  as the case of naive expectations). Applying the law of iterated 
expectations, we obtain ℰ𝑡
ℬ𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝜃
2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖,𝑡+1, then aggregating 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
ℬ
1
𝛼
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜃
2𝑥𝑡−1 (18) 
By imposing some minimal restrictions to the heuristics used by the SSFs, Branch and 
McGough (2009) show that (17) implies a micro-founded representation of the sticky 
price New Keynesian model very similar to the traditional case (4)-(10).  
The generalization of the New Keynesian sticky price model to heterogeneous 
expectations, in fact, implies that the conditional expected values in (4) and (5) are 
replaced by a convex combination of expectations operators (rational (16) and heuristics 
(18)). The aggregate IS demand curve and the Phillips curve become: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃
2𝑦𝑡−1 −
𝑟𝑡 − 𝛼𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜃
2𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑡𝛥𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑
𝜎
 (19) 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽[𝛼𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃
2𝜋𝑡−1] + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 (20) 
The rest of the model is instead still described by (6)-(10).  
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2.4 Long-term forecasters13 
LHFs use heuristics to forecast macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. The 
selection of heuristics takes place at the beginning of period 𝑡, when they observe and 
compare past performances. Each predictor 𝜃𝑖 ∈ Θ, ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1], is evaluated according to the 
past squared forecast error (performance measure). The distribution of beliefs then 
evolves over time as a function of past performances according to the continuous choice 
model (Diks and van der Weide, 2005). The distribution of beliefs is normal and its 
evolution is characterized by a mean equal to 𝑥𝑡−1 and a finite variance that is decreasing 
in the agents’ sensitivity to differences in performances.  
Aggregating among boundedly rational agents, we obtain 
 ∫ ℰ𝑖,𝑡
1
𝛼
𝑥𝑡+1𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) ∫ 𝜃𝑖
Θ
𝑑𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝑥𝑡−1 (21) 
 
By using (21) into (13) and (14), we get  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
[(1 − 𝛽)𝑦𝑠 −
𝛽
𝜎
(𝑟𝑠 − 𝜋𝑠+1)] + 
 +(1 − 𝛼) [𝑦𝑡−1 −
𝛽
𝜎
(1 − 𝛽)𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝛽𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝜋𝑡−1
1 − 𝛽
] −
𝐸𝑡𝛥𝑧𝑡+1
𝑑
𝜎
 (22) 
and 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑡 ∑(𝜉𝑝𝛽)
𝑠−𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡
[(1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽𝜋𝑠+1 + 𝜅𝑚𝑐𝑠] + 
 +(1 − 𝛼) [
𝜃𝑘
1 − 𝜉𝑝𝛽
𝑚𝑐𝑡−1 +
𝜃(1 − 𝜉𝑝)𝛽
1 − 𝜉𝑝𝛽
𝜋𝑡−1] + 𝑧𝑡
𝑚 (23) 
where we assumed that the current interest rate is observed by boundedly rational 
agents, while current output and inflation are not.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
This section briefly outlines how to draw from the posterior distribution of structural 
parameters and to compute the log–marginal likelihood associated with each model. 
First, we present a description of the data used in our estimation and the prior densities 
of the assumed estimated parameters. Second, we test the stability of the different 
models via Monte Carlo Filtering. Third, we report the estimation of the structural 
parameters and compare the log–marginal likelihood of the models. Finally, we provide 
the validation of models incorporating bounded rationality by comparing their second 
moments and correlations against the current data.  
3.1 Data and methodology 
We estimate the models described in the previous section by Bayesian techniques. 14 
Specifically, we estimate the two behavioral New Keynesian models: the SSFs’ model, 
                                           
13LHFs are modeled as in Preston (2006) and Massaro (2013) to whom we refer for details. 
14We used Dynare MatLab routines to simulate and estimate the models (see Adjemian et al., 2011). 
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where agents behave according to their short–run expectations ((6)–(10) and (19)–
(20)); and the LHFs’ model ((6)-(10) and (22)–(23)), where agents take their decisions 
considering their long–horizon expectations. For the sake of comparison, we also 
estimate the baseline New Keynesian model (4)–(10), where agents are homogeneous 
and rational such that here their horizon forecast does not matter.  
After writing each model in state-space form, the likelihood function is evaluated 
according to the Kalman filter, whereas prior distributions are used to introduce 
additional non-sample information into the parameter estimation. Once a prior 
distribution is elicited, the posterior density for the structural parameters can be 
obtained by re-weighting the likelihood by a prior. The posterior is computed using 
numerical integration by applying the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm for Monte 
Carlo integration. For the sake of simplicity, all structural parameters are supposed to be 
independent of one another.15  
We consider a sample of United States quarterly data ranging from 1984:Q1 to 
2008:Q2.16 Namely, these observables are the log of the real GDP as a measure for the 
output gap, the Federal Funds rate as a proxy for the nominal interest rate, the log-
difference of the GDP deflator as a proxy for inflation, and the log of the expected 
inflation series. Expected inflation is taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).17 All the other data are drawn 
from the FRED database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Data on 
nominal interest rate and inflation have been demeaned, whereas data on real GDP has 
been detrended by the Hodrick–Prescott filter.18  
Beyond the structural shocks described in the previous section, we add a measurement 
error (𝑒𝑡
𝜋) to the inflation observable and one shock to the expected inflation evolution, 
𝑒𝑡
𝜋𝐸.19 To recap, the model is affected by six shocks and four observables are employed 
for the estimation; as a result, our econometric procedure does not imply problems 
deriving from stochastic singularity.20  
3.2 Prior distributions and calibrated parameters 
The prior distributions of the estimated parameters are weakly informative and centered 
on values similar to the calibrations used by Branch and McGough (2009) and Massaro 
(2013). The pivotal parameters of our estimation are 𝛼, denoting the share of rational 
agents, and 𝜃, representing the adaptation parameter. We assign to 𝛼 a Beta distribution 
with mean 0.8 and standard deviation 0.1: this decision comes from the fact that being 𝛼 
a share, it can take value between 0 and 1. The adaptation parameter 𝜃 has a Gamma 
distribution centered on the naive case, i.e., 1, and with standard deviation 0.2.  
The priors of the other parameters are elicited as follows: the relative risk aversion 
coefficient ( 𝜎 ) has mean of 0.157  with standard deviation 0.1  and follows a Gamma 
                                           
15For an exhaustive analysis of Bayesian estimation methods, see Geweke (1999), An and Schorfheide (2007), 
or Fernández-Villaverde (2010). 
16The end of our sample is chosen in order to avoid to deal with the zero–lower bound on nominal interest rate. 
17See Milani (2007) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2011). 
18Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Ascari et al. (2011), the computation of the Hodrick–Prescott 
detrended measure of output is made employing a sample (1960:Q1–2008:Q2) longer than the one used for 
the estimation. In this way, we increase the number of observations exploited to compute the cyclical 
component of output. Consequently, our detrended output measure has a nonzero mean for the sample used 
for the estimation; thus, we need to demean it. 
19The need of adding a measurement error to the inflation arises mainly for two reasons. First, its introduction 
helps the inversion of the Hessian matrix computed at the posterior mode. Second, it improves the model fit, 
in particular by looking at the sign of the cross–correlation between inflation and output (see Section 3.5). 
20Technical issues deriving from misspecification are widely discussed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and 
Fernández–Villaverde (2010). 
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distribution. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (𝜔) has a Gamma distribution with mean 
2 and standard deviation 1. The Calvo parameter (𝜉𝑝) is centered on a 0.75 mean with 
standard deviation 0.15  and has a Beta distribution. Taylor rule parameters are both 
normally distributed: the feedback parameter of inflation (𝛿𝜋) is centered on a mean 
equal to 1.5 and with standard deviation 0.2, whereas the policy rate response to the 
output gap (𝛿𝑦) has a mean of 0.2 with standard deviation 0.1.  
The six exogenous shocks follow an Inverse Gamma distribution centered on a mean 
equal to 0.01 and with two degrees of freedom. The autoregressive component of the 
shocks follows a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2.  
As common practice in estimated DSGE models, some parameters need to be calibrated 
either because they are difficult to estimate or because can lead to identification 
problems.21 Specifically, the discount factor (𝛽) is calibrated to 0.99 and the elasticity of 
substitution between goods (𝜖) is calibrated to 7.84, implying a net mark-up of around 
15%.  
3.3 Mapping the stability: Monte Carlo Filtering 
In a Bayesian approach, identifying the determinacy region of the model is a 
fundamental step. It allows to initialize the estimation within the portion of the 
acceptable domain of model coefficients, excluding indeterminacy or instability. We know 
that introducing heterogeneous expectations in behavioral New Keynesian DSGE models 
strongly shrinks the stability domain of the model (Branch and McGough, 2009; 
Massaro, 2013). Therefore, we explore the parameter space to detect those that mostly 
drive the model towards indeterminate or unstable regions using a Monte Carlo Filtering 
technique (described below).  
Massaro (2013) and Branch and McGough (2009) also provide some numerical analysis 
of determinacy. By using some common calibrations, 22  they focus on how the 
determinacy properties of the models are affected by changes in the parameters of a 
simple Taylor rule. Both conclude that a–more–than–one response of the interest rate to 
inflation does not necessarily guarantee a unique equilibrium in a world with 
heterogeneous agents.  
In the set of parameters considered by Massaro (2013), LHFs imply that a–more–than–
one response of the interest rate is no longer a sufficient condition, but it becomes a 
necessary condition for determinacy. Moreover, the higher is the interest rate response 
to inflation, the more the central bank should also respond to the output gap to ensure 
determinacy. In the model with SSFs provided by Branch and McGough (2009), the 
more–than–one response suffices to drive the model towards the determinate region 
only when it is combined with a small–feedback reaction to the output gap. But, as 
agents become more extrapolative, i.e., 𝜃 > 1, the monetary authority must respond 
more aggressively to inflationary pressure to guarantee the equilibrium determinacy.  
We complement the above results by a Monte Carlo Filtering (MCF) mapping, exploring a 
larger space of parameters. MCF mapping is a procedure implemented to detect the 
parameters that mostly drive the model towards indeterminate and unstable regions. As 
explained by Ratto (2008), a multi-parameter Monte Carlo simulation is performed, 
sampling model parameters (𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑘)  from prior ranges, and propagating parameter 
values through the model. Two regions are distinguished: a target stable behavior region 
𝐵, where the Blanchard–Kahn (1980) rank conditions are satisfied, and an unacceptable 
                                           
21We check the correct identification of the subset of estimated parameters using the Identification toolbox for 
Dynare, which implements the identification condition developed by Iskrev (2010a, 2010b). For a review of 
identification issues arising in DSGE models, see Canova and Sala (2009). 
22Branch and McGough (2009) focus on SSFs and consider the calibrations used by Woodford (1999), Clarida et 
al. (2000) and McCallum and Nelson (1999). Massaro (2013) calibrates a model with LHFs as Galí and Gertler 
(1999). 
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behavior region 𝐵, characterized by model instability or indeterminacy. Running 𝑁 Monte 
Carlo draws we obtain, for each parameter 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . 𝑘, two subsets: (𝑋𝑖|𝐵) of size 𝑛 and 
(𝑋𝑖|𝐵)  of size 𝑛 , where 𝑛 + 𝑛 = 𝑁 . These subsets represent draws from unknown 
probability density functions, 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵) and 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵).  
A certain parameter 𝑋𝑖  is a key factor in driving model behavior whether the two 
distributions 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵)  and 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵)  are significantly different; therefore, there will be 
subsets of values in the predefined range of 𝑋𝑖 that are more likely to fall under 𝐵 than 
under 𝐵. Instead, when the two distributions are not significantly different, 𝑋𝑖 plays no 
role in driving the behavior of the model and any value in its predefined range is likely to 
fall either in 𝐵 or in 𝐵.  
The identification of the parameters that mostly drive the DSGE model into the target 
behavior, is obtained by comparing the distributions 𝑓𝑛  and 𝑓𝑛 , using a two-sided 
Smirnov-Kolmogorov test for each parameter. The test is defined in relation to the 
cumulative distribution functions of 𝑋𝑖 by: 
 𝑑𝑛,𝑛(𝑋𝑖) = sup ∥ 𝐹𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵) − 𝐹𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵) ∥ (24) 
The null hypothesis of the test is 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵) = 𝑓𝑛(𝑋𝑖|𝐵) . Finally, we need to define the 
significance level 𝜏 at which the statistic 𝑑𝑛,𝑛(𝑋𝑖) rejects the null. In general, the greater 
𝑑𝑛,𝑛(𝑋𝑖) (or, alternatively, the smaller is 𝜏) the more important is parameter 𝑋𝑖 for driving 
model behavior.  
We run the MCF mapping23 in the models we estimate to grab information about which 
parameters mostly drive the acceptable behavior and which region of the parameter 
space drives the models towards a unique equilibrium. In Table 1 we summarize the 
results of the Smirnov-Kolmogorov test in leading to the acceptable behavior. We label 
by “SSFs” the model with short-sighted forecasts, while “LHFs” indicates the model with 
long-horizon predictors. An asterisk denotes that the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
parameter in question affects the behavior of the model.  
 
Table 1 - Smirnov-Kolmogorov statistics in driving acceptable behavior   
Param.   Acceptable behavior   Indeterminacy   Instability   
  SSFs  LHFs   SSFs  LHFs   SSFs  LHFs   
𝛼   0.149* 0.406*   0.454*  0.796*   0.228*  0.039   
𝜃   0.504*  –   0.235*  –   0.337*  –   
𝜎   0.022  0.079   0.020  0.263*   0.015  0.009   
𝜔   0.025  0.180*   0.027  0.089   0.010  0.010   
𝜉𝑝   0.084  0.187
*   0.057  0.118   0.037  0.013   
𝛿𝜋   0.442
*  0.305*   0.513
*  0.522*   0.123
*  0.028   
𝛿𝑦   0.027  0.136   0.044  0.105   0.016  0.009   
𝜌𝑎   0.013  0.075   0.023  0.121   0.009  0.003   
𝜌𝑑   0.017  0.045   0.025  0.099   0.013  0.000   
𝜌𝑚   0.017  0.073   0.041  0.063   0.016  0.000   
 
Differently from the standard framework, a failure to reach a unique equilibrium can lead 
to both instability or indeterminacy. The presence of boundedly rational agents 
introduces backward-looking components in the model dynamics, as a result unstable 
eigenvalues that ensure determinate equilibrium in a completely forward-looking model 
may now induce unstable dynamics.  
                                           
23This analysis is performed using the Global Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) toolbox for Dynare. 
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In both models 𝛼 and 𝛿𝜋 are pivotal parameters in driving the acceptable behavior. In 
particular, in both cases the cumulative probability distribution for unacceptable behavior 
is shifted on the left,24 indicating that the probability of model stability increases for high 
values of 𝛼 and 𝛿𝜋. Looking at the indeterminacy, the cumulative probability distribution 
of 𝛿𝜋  is still shifted on the left, i.e., high values of 𝛿𝜋  avoid indeterminacy, while the 
cumulative probability distribution of 𝛼 is shifted on the right, signaling that high values 
of 𝛼 increase the probability of falling in the indeterminacy region. These results hold for 
both models.  
The short-sighted framework is also affected by the adaptation parameter 𝜃. On the one 
hand, a low value for 𝜃 drives the model towards the acceptable behavior and avoids 
explosiveness. On the other hand, it increases the likelihood of indeterminacy.  
Regarding the remaining parameters, the determinacy of the model with LHFs compared 
to the SSFs’s framework is more sensible to parameter changes. In particular, a higher 
degree of price rigidity raises the probability to hit the determinacy region.  
Summarizing, the stability properties of the two models are not very different, we can 
choose a comparable starting calibration for the initialization of our estimation. However, 
in a LHFs context, more parameters may lead to deviate from the determinacy region 
and the model is more likely to fail to reach the unique equilibrium. 
3.4 Estimation results and model comparison 
The estimation of the structural parameters of our two behavioral New Keynesian models 
is reported in Table 2. We also report estimates from the baseline New Keynesian model 
(labeled “NK”), where all the agents are rational. The table reports priors (mean and 
density) and posteriors (with their [5𝑡ℎ,  95𝑡ℎ] probability intervals), and the log–marginal 
likelihood for each model. The posterior distributions are obtained using the MH 
algorithm. The mean and posterior percentiles come from two chains of 200,000 draws 
each from the MH algorithm, for which we discarded the initial 30% of draws. The scale 
for the jumping distribution in MH algorithm has been calibrated to achieve an 
acceptance rate around 25%.  
 
Table 2 – Prior and posterior distributions for structural parameters   
Par.  Prior density  Prior mean  Posterior mean [5th pct,  95th pct]   
  (Std.dev.)
25  SSFs  LHFs  NK   
𝜎  Gamma  0.157  0.193  0.042  0.162   
  (0.10)  [0.057,0.318]  [0.028,0.056]  [0.026,0.290]   
𝜔  Gamma  2.00  5.037  1.332  5.023   
  (1.00)  [3.304,6.671]  [0.780,1.869]  [3.335,6.677]   
𝜉𝑝  Beta  0.75  0.521  0.668  0.567   
  (0.15)  [0.347,0.695]  [0.646,0.689]  [0.416,0.727]   
𝛼  Beta  0.80  0.540  0.874  1   
  (0.10)  [0.367,0.703]  [0.838,0.910]  [-]   
𝜃  Gamma  1.00  0.757  1  1   
  (0.20)  [0.606,0.903]  [-]  [-]   
𝛿𝜋  Normal  1.50  2.485  1.219  2.586   
  (0.20)  [2.278,2.723]  [1.126,1.314]  [2.441,2.772]   
𝛿𝑦  Normal  0.20  0.098  0.330  0.116   
  (0.10)  [0.024,0.173]  [0.216,0.441]  [0.048,0.181]   
𝜌𝑎  Beta  0.50  0.919  0.305  0.884   
                                           
24The figures produced by Dynare are available upon request. 
25 For the Inverse Gamma distributions, the degrees of freedom are indicated. 
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  (0.20)  [0.863,0.978]  [0.097,0.505]  [0.816,0.960]   
𝜌𝑑  Beta  0.50  0.910  0.426  0.913   
  (0.20)  [0.881,0.939]  [0.191,0.663]  [0.884,0.940]   
𝜌𝑚  Beta  0.50  0.579  0.230  0.567   
  (0.20)  [0.252,0.907]  [0.052,0.393]  [0.247,0.921]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑎  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0030  0.0023  0.0032   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.004]  [0.002,0.003]  [0.003,0.004]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑟  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0035  0.0044  0.0036   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.005]  [0.003,0.006]  [0.002,0.005]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑑  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0147  0.0041  0.0123   
  (2.00)  [0.010,0.020]  [0.002,0.006]  [0.009,0.016]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑚  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0052  0.0027  0.0056   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.008]  [0.002,0.004]  [0.003,0.004]   
𝑒𝑡
𝜋  Inv. Gamma   0.0022  0.0055  0.0022   
   [0.002,0.003]  [0.005,0.006]  [0.002,0.003]   
𝑒𝑡
𝜋𝐸  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0018  0.0053  0.0020   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.002]  [0.005,0.006]  [0.002,0.002]   
      
Log marginal likelihood  1784.474  1517.106  1774.219   
 
In the behavioral New Keynesian model with SSFs, we estimate a share of rational 
agents close to 55%, implying that about 45% of individuals are boundedly rational. The 
adaptation parameter is estimated to 0.75, non–rational agents are adaptive. The other 
parameters are akin to the deep parameters estimated in the standard New Keynesian 
model.  
The response of the central bank to the inflation is strong, while its reaction to the 
output gap is moderated; a similar result has been found by Clarida et al. (2000) for the 
Great Moderation period. The Calvo parameter is estimated to 0.52 entailing that prices 
are adjusted about every two quarters. Interestingly, this value is in line with the 
microeconometric evidence on price setting that calls for price updates every 2 – 3 
quarters (see Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and Malin, 2011). Finally, the technology 
shock shows a large degree of autocorrelation, a common result in estimated DSGE 
models (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007).  
In the behavioral New Keynesian model with LHFs, the estimated share of rational 
agents is quite large. The estimated value is 87%, implying a low fraction of boundedly 
rational agents (i.e., 13%).26   The other parameter estimates also differ from those 
obtained when bounded rationality is formed according to a short-sighted mechanism 
(and from those obtained from the standard New Keynesian model). The estimated 
coefficients of the Taylor rule imply that the monetary authority reacts to inflation 
implementing the Taylor principle, but as 𝛿𝜋 is relatively small, the estimated response 
to the output gap is quite high. The estimated degree of price rigidity is higher compared 
to the model with SSFs, involving an average duration of a price spell of about three 
quarters. All the shocks exhibit a small degree of autocorrelation.  
We interpret the different estimations of the Taylor rule in the SSFs’ and LHFs’ 
framework as the result of the fact that models have different determinacy regions which 
are differently affected by Taylor rule coefficients. Specifically, the behavioral New 
Keynesian model with LHFs is less likely to match determinacy. The estimation seems to 
drive estimated Taylor coefficients towards the values that fulfill the model stability. The 
model with LHFs requires in fact to raise the feedback coefficient associated to the 
output gap to ensure determinacy. The estimation of the Calvo parameter also goes in 
that direction, from the stability mapping, illustrated in the previous subsection, we 
                                           
26The adaptation parameter is 1 as in Massaro (2013). 
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know that a higher degree of price rigidity helps the LHFs’ model to meet the 
determinacy region.  
We now investigate how the manner in which bounded rationality is formed (SSFs or 
LHFs) affects the fit of a model. To understand which model fits better the data we 
compare them via Bayes factor. The model with the highest log marginal likelihood 
better explains the data (see Kass and Raftery, 1995).27  
The log–marginal likelihoods associated with the two model specifications considered 
herein are reported in the last row of Table 2. The difference, in terms of log–marginal 
likelihood, between the two models is 267.36. According to Jeffreys’ scale of evidence,28 
this difference must be considered as “decisive” evidence in favor of SSFs.  
For the sake of completeness, we compare the SSFs’ behavioral New Keynesian model to 
the standard rational expectation framework. The parameter estimates are quite similar. 
Looking at the Bayes factor, the difference in terms of log–marginal likelihood between 
these two models is about 10, entailing a “substantial” evidence in favor of the model 
with SSF.  
Our result is not surprising as the SSFs model incorporates lagged terms both in the IS 
and the Phillips curves: the presence of these backward components introduces 
persistence in the model and allows to capture the degree of inertia present in the data. 
The basic New Keynesian model is instead purely forward looking and fails to capture 
output persistence and inflation inertia.  
The standard New Keynesian model however strongly performs better than the model 
with LHFs—despite the latter specification is also able to account for output persistence 
and inflation inertia. The result further confirms the poor predictive ability associated 
with LHFs.  
Some additional investigation about the model’s ability to fit the data and their validation 
is provided in the next subsection.  
3.5 Models validation 
This section further attempts to understand how well behavioral–macro models 
presented here fit the data and capture their dynamics. We compare a set of business 
cycle statistics implied by the estimated models to those measured in the data. We study 
the second moments, autocorrelation, and cross-correlation with respect to the output of 
the observable variables included in the estimation. These summary statistics have been 
standard means of validating models in the literature on DSGE models. Comparing 
models’ moments is useful to assess the absolute fit of a model to macroeconomic data, 
inspecting whether the model correctly predicts population moments, such as the 
variables’ volatility or their autocorrelation (see, e.g., Justiniano et al., 2011; Cantore et 
al., 2015).  
In Table 3 we present our results. We report the second moments and correlations 
arising from our estimations and compare them with those found in the current data for 
the sample range (i.e., 1984:Q1–2008:Q2).  
 
Table 3 - Second moments and correlations for observable variables and actual data   
Series  Standard deviation    Autocorrelation (order=1)   
                                           
27 For a similar approach see, e.g., Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005), Riggi and Tancioni (2010), Di 
Bartolomeo and Di Pietro (2017). 
28Jeffreys (1961) developed a scale to evaluate the Bayes factor indication. Odds ranging from 1:1 to 3:1 give 
“very slight evidence”, odds from 3:1 to 10:1 are “substantial”, odds from 10:1 to 100:1 give “strong to very 
strong evidence”, and odds greater than 100:1 are “decisive evidence.” 
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 Data  SSFs  LHFs  NK    Data  SSFs  LHFs  NK   
Output  0.0103  0.0121  0.0143  0.0106    0.89  0.92  0.13  0.89   
Inflation  0.0022  0.0019  0.0097  0.0017    0.58  0.56  0.96  0.45   
Exp. Inflation  0.0019  0.0021  0.0110  0.0022    0.71  0.24  0.74  0.21   
Interest rate  0.0058  0.0037  0.0096  0.0034    0.94  0.92  0.96  0.90   
           
Series  Standard deviation relative to output   Cross-correlation with output   
 Data  SSFs  LHFs  NK    Data  SSFs  LHFs  NK   
Inflation  0.213  0.157  0.678  0.160    0.27  0.04  -0.46  0.08   
Exp. Inflation  0.184  0.173  0.769  0.207    0.39  0.01  -0.28  0.01   
Interest rate  0.563  0.305  0.671  0.320    0.47  0.33  -0.47  0.38   
 
Moments implied by the model with SSFs are the closest to the data. The only pitfall of 
the SSFs’ specification is that it captures a too low first–order autocorrelation for the 
expected inflation. Model with LHFs shows a bad fit: both observed inflation and 
expected inflation are too volatile (about five times higher than the data), output 
exhibits a slight degree of autocorrelation, and the cross-correlation with output for both 
interest rate and inflation has the wrong sign.  
In general, the fit of the standard New Keynesian model is as good as the fit arising 
under a SSFs’ mechanism. However, the latter model estimates moments slightly closer 
to the data, looking at the standard deviations and the autocorrelations. These factors 
favor it in the Bayesian race above described.  
Summarizing, the model with long-horizon predictors exhibits very poor predictive 
ability, while the overall model fit derived under a short-sighted mechanism is the best 
in predictions and the closest to the data. The next section will shed some light on the 
sources of the empirical superiority of SSFs’ over LHFs’ model.  
4. Investigating the best predictive ability of the SSFs’ model 
We have learned that there is a huge difference between behavioral–macro models 
based on SSFs or LHFs in terms of parameter estimates and model–predictive ability. As 
discussed, compared to the basic New Keynesian model, empirical superiority of the 
short-sighted framework is somehow expected, as the standard setup cannot properly 
capture output persistence and (intrinsic) inflation inertia (see, e.g., Fuhrer, 2011). By 
contrast, the poor predictive ability of the LHFs’ model is surprising. Possibly, it derives 
from the restriction of the parameter space imposed by the determinacy condition. To 
meet this region, posteriors are forced to overestimate the output coefficient of the 
Taylor rule and the price stickiness.  
The sources of the different performances of the two behavioral macro–model can be 
further investigated by considering mixed frameworks. In line of principle, firms and 
households could use different horizons when forming their expectations: firms could be 
LHFs and households SSFs or vice versa. We refer to these cases as mixed models. They 
are characterized by IS and Phillips curves derived under alternative assumptions for the 
forecasting mechanism, which are differently affected by bounded rationality. By mixed 
models, we can empirically test (i) whether different kinds of agents, specifically firms or 
households, use disparate schemes for their forecasts; (ii) whether a mixed model fits 
the aggregate data better than other specifications or not.  
We focus on the mixed case where firms are LHFs and households are SSFs, i.e., a 
specification characterized by a Phillips curve a la Massaro (2013) and an IS curve a la 
Branch and McGough (2009).29 The model in question does not figure out particular 
                                           
29 Mixed model needs further clarifications regarding the underlying assumptions on heterogeneous 
expectations and places a particular structure on higher order beliefs. In the Yeoman Farmer model a la Branch 
and McGough (2009), heterogeneous expectations among households straight forward translate into the 
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determinacy problems. We do not consider (and estimate) the case when firms are SSFs 
and households have long-horizon beliefs since it never fulfills the determinacy region.30  
Our mixed model (labeled “mixed” in the table below) is formally composed by the 
demand curve (19) and the Phillips curve (23). The remaining equations are (6)–(10). 
The estimates are presented in Table 4. As usual, we report the posterior means and 
[5𝑡ℎ pct,  95𝑡ℎ pct] percentiles. For sake of comparison, we also report again the estimated 
parameters for the short-sighted model from Table 3. Remember that the model with 
SSFs won the likelihood race among the other models considered in our investigation.  
 
Table 4 –Prior and posterior distributions for structural parameters   
Par.  Prior density  Prior mean  Posterior mean [5th pct,  95th pct]   
  (Std.dev.)  SSFs  Mixed   
𝜎  Gamma  0.157  0.193  0.213   
  (0.10)  [0.057,0.318]  [0.092,0.332]   
𝜔  Gamma  2.00  5.037  4.425   
  (1.00)  [3.304,6.671]  [2.859,5.882]   
𝜉𝑝  Beta  0.75  0.521  0.788   
  (0.15)  [0.347,0.695]  [0.581,0.955]   
𝛼  Beta  0.80  0.540  0.667   
  (0.10)  [0.367,0.703]  [0.521,0.805]   
𝜃  Gamma  1.00  0.757  1.142   
  (0.20)  [0.606,0.903]  [0.770,1.487]   
𝛿𝜋  Normal  1.50  2.485  2.621   
  (0.20)  [2.278,2.723]  [2.487,2.772]   
𝛿𝑦  Normal  0.20  0.098  0.086   
  (0.10)  [0.024,0.173]  [0.017,0.151]   
𝜌𝑎  Beta  0.50  0.919  0.912   
  (0.20)  [0.863,0.978]  [0.853,0.977]   
𝜌𝑑  Beta  0.50  0.910  0.910   
  (0.20)  [0.881,0.939]  [0.882,0.940]   
𝜌𝑚  Beta  0.50  0.579  0.625   
  (0.20)  [0.252,0.907]  [0.327,0.932]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑎  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0030  0.0029   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.004]  [0.002,0.004]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑟  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0035  0.0030   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.005]  [0.002,0.004]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑑  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0147  0.0125   
  (2.00)  [0.010,0.020]  [0.008,0.017]   
𝑒𝑡
𝑚  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0052  0.0056   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.008]  [0.002,0.009]   
𝑒𝑡
𝜋  Inv. Gamma   0.0022  0.0023   
   [0.002,0.003]  [0.002,0.003]   
                                                                                                                                   
expectations of firms. However, the model with decentralized markets as Massaro (2013) requires to explain 
why the owner of a firm could form LHFs that are fundamentally different from the expectations of the 
shareholders that are SSFs. Even in this framework a risk sharing mechanism operates in the sense that each 
household consists of a continuum of agents which are employed across firms and share dividends across the 
household to ensure against the Calvo risk. Furthermore, in both modeling setup, rational agents are not 
sophisticated enough to back out the expectations of boundedly agents since they have wrong second order 
beliefs, i.e., they are not fully rational. Then the problem does not arise in the sense that even the rational 
entrepreneur would not be able to recognize that agents different from him behave in the market and 
eventually work in his firm and the risk sharing mechanism would eventually correct from the distortions 
created by the heterogeneity. 
30Sensitivity analysis were performed with the GSA toolbox. Results are available upon request. 
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𝑒𝑡
𝜋𝐸  Inv. Gamma  0.01  0.0018  0.0019   
  (2.00)  [0.002,0.002]  [0.002,0.002]   
     
Log marginal likelihood  1784.474  1783.531   
 
The estimated parameters of the mixed model are similar to those estimated in the 
model where all the agents are SSFs. Some remarkable differences involve the fraction 
of rational agents that now is slightly higher and the adaptation parameter, estimated to 
be greater than one and entailing extrapolative expectations. Therefore, the degree of 
price rigidity is higher and translates into an average price duration of about four 
quarters. The mixed specification inherits some stability characteristics from the LHFs’ 
model. In such a case, MCF shows that a high degree of price rigidity and larger share of 
rational agents is required to fulfill model determinacy.  
The log–marginal likelihood associated with the mixed model is almost identical to that 
obtained in a context of SSFs. According to the Jeffreys’ scale of evidence, we can state 
that this difference is negligible. If we inspect the second moments, they are quite 
identical among these two specifications.31  
We ran two further empirical tests to check the robustness of the results discussed in 
this section.  
1. We estimated both models with an interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule. In 
the previous section, we had not considered the smoothing parameters because 
(i) we strictly followed the specification by Branch and McGough (2009) and 
Massaro (2013) who inspect the stability properties of their models without 
considering smoothing in the Taylor rule (ii) introducing a smoothing coefficient in 
the set of estimated parameters negatively affects the stability region of the 
model with LHFs, further tightening the parameter space where model has 
acceptable behavior and making its estimation hard. 
2. An additional robustness check we did was to estimate the models reported in 
Table 4 constraining the adaptation parameter to be equal to one, i.e., imposing 
naive expectations. 
Both robustness checks above–described led to results very similar to those presented in 
Table 4, in terms of estimated parameters and in terms of model comparison.32  
To summarize, modeling mechanism of bounded rationality for price–setters by SSFs or 
LHFs leads to very similar dynamics. Instead, the way in which forecasts are done has 
relevant implications for the households. If households use long-horizon predictors 
dramatically deteriorates the model fit and, as well, its forecast ability. We thus 
recommend to model bounded rationality following a short-sighted forecast scheme for 
the household sector, whereas assuming short-sighted or long-horizon predictors for the 
firms does not remarkably worsen the model fit.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Behavioral New-Keynesian DSGE models are becoming quite popular in macroeconomics 
(Branch and McGough, 2009, 2016; Massaro 2013). Assuming that a fraction of agents 
form beliefs about the future according to some heuristics, we have compared two 
alternative mechanisms used to introduce heterogeneous expectations. The alternatives 
                                           
31Standard deviation, autocorrelation and cross-correlation with output associated with the mixed model are 
not reported here to save space. However, they are available upon request. 
32For the sake of brevity, we do not report the tables with parameter estimates. They are available upon 
request. 
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differ in the forecast horizon of the agents (short vs. long), which does not matter when 
all the agents have rational expectations.  
Based on the different expectation–formation mechanisms, we have built different DSGE 
models. The models have then been estimated by Bayesian techniques and alternatives 
have been compared by marginal likelihoods. We have also explored the indeterminacy 
regions implied by the two alternatives using Monte-Carlo-Filtering mapping.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows.  
1. Marginal likelihoods show that a behavioral New-Keynesian model including short 
forecasters fits the data better than one based on long forecasters. Short 
forecasters also outperform rational expectations.  
2. Moments implied by the model with short-horizon predictors are the closest to 
the observed data. By contrast, the model with long-horizon predictors exhibits a 
poor predictive ability.  
3. The superiority of the short forecasters’ model over the others considered is due 
to the behavioral specification of the dynamic aggregate demand equation, which 
better fits heterogeneity in consumers’ expectations. Conversely, heterogeneity in 
the supply side of the economy is less relevant to discriminate between the 
models.  
4. The Monte Carlo filtering mapping generalizes the results of Branch and McGough 
(2009) and Massaro (2013) obtained for a more restrictive set of parameters. A 
model based on long-horizon predictors is less stable. As a result, for our 
estimations, it tends to overestimate the degree of price stickiness and the 
central bank’s response to the output gap to match the stability region.  
Our results suggest that the enhancement of more complex medium-sized New 
Keynesian models with a fraction of boundedly rational agents who are short–run 
forecasters could be fruitful. We let this to future researches. Our findings also give a 
suggestion to the economists who study the expectations formation processes using 
microdata. They suggest to focus on expectations of households rather than on those of 
price-setters. Aggregate–macro outcomes in fact seem to be more sensible to how the 
former are modeled.  
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